Israeli Military Operations in Lebanon in 1993 and 1996

Israel’s 1993 and 1996 military operations in Lebanon appear in the book as part of a longer pattern of Israeli military action backed by the United States. Their significance in the account lies not only in the operations themselves, but in the political relationship they expose: Washington’s support continued until the international response to the 1996 Qana massacre compelled Bill Clinton to back down.

Background and Context

The discussion places the two operations after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which the book says killed about 18,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and was not an act of self-defense, a point it describes as having been acknowledged immediately. It also recalls the subsequent “iron fist” campaign against what Israeli terminology called “terrorist villagers.” Against that history, the 1993 and 1996 actions are presented not as isolated episodes but as further incursions within an extended course of military pressure.

The book challenges the selective use of the language of self-defense and terrorism, arguing that state violence and violence by non-state actors should not be judged by different standards. Its wider critique of political labels also treats descriptions such as “humanitarian intervention” as potentially masking force rather than explaining its purposes. The Lebanon operations thus form part of a broader argument about how powerful states and their allies characterize violence and distribute responsibility for it.

Operations and United States Support

The account states that the United States firmly supported both Israeli operations in 1993 and 1996. It gives no operational chronology or detailed description of the military campaigns, but emphasizes the backing as a sustained political fact, linking it to the earlier invasion and the violence that followed. The operations are included among examples of American support for military actions that the author considers coercive and harmful to civilians.

The political limit of that support appears in the aftermath of the 1996 Qana massacre. International reactions to the massacre, the book says, forced Bill Clinton to retreat. The episode therefore marks a contrast between Washington’s strong backing for the operations and the pressure that international condemnation could exert when their consequences drew wider attention.

Place in the Book’s Argument

The Lebanon case contributes to the book’s challenge to a one-sided account of terrorism and state violence. By setting the operations alongside the 1982 invasion and its reported civilian toll, the author asks readers to apply a consistent moral standard regardless of whether violence is committed by an adversary or by a state supported by the United States. The cited civilian death estimate for the 1982 invasion—about 18,000—belongs specifically to that earlier invasion, not to the 1993 and 1996 operations.

The account also connects the operations to the wider question of American power: support for an ally’s military actions is portrayed as part of a recurring policy, while the retreat after Qana shows that public and international reaction could constrain that support. The book offers this sequence as evidence in its critique of selective accountability, rather than as a detailed military history of either operation.